Introductory note 

The two articles (the second one to follow soon) purport to evaluate the Constitution (Amendment) Bill currently being debated in the National Assembly. It is arguably the most important legislation presented since our Independence with broad and deep consequences on the character, ethos and values of our bespoke representative democracy.

The Bill’s object is to reform certain aspects of our electoral system. Crucially, at clause 7, it repeals a foundational clause of our Constitution that has been the bedrock of parliamentary representation in a deeply multi-ethnic and diverse society. Clause 5 (1) of the existing First Schedule that guarantees ‘fair and adequate representation’ to all sections of our rainbow nation by a specifically-tailored, factually-objective and independently-enforced mechanism simply disappears.

 There is no attempt to provide the necessary information and explanation on the deletion of such a vital safeguard of our Constitution especially to a significant share of our population that has been comforted by such guarantees since Independence. It is replaced in a new First Schedule by a curious, vague, abstruse and encrypted provision that must be decoded to fully grasp its intention to be a putative substitute for the Constitutional safeguard being deleted.

 It is at clause 8 (6) of the new First Schedule and states that: 

‘after the computation by the Electoral Supervisory Commission of the number of additional seats to be allocated to each qualifying party, the PARTY LEADER of such party shall nominate the person to whom any additional seat be allocated’.

 I shall explain the calamitous consequences of this amendment on diversity, inclusion and representation in the National Assembly in the second article. First, I shall critically appraise the other clauses of the Bill.

Preserve the desirable features of the reform 

We should keep the good attributes of the Bill. These are:

 i) retention of the current First Past The Post (FPTP) system as the main pillar of our voting system ; ii) 20 three-member constituencies in the island of Mauritius ;

 iii) guarantee that the absolute winner of the FPTP election should be the overall winner. But not in the way proposed; 

iv) eligibility threshold for (Proportional Representation) PR seats at 10% of national vote ;

 v) PR party list should be pre-established, closed and rank-based;

 vi) no need for candidates to disclose their community belonging to stand for elections;

Address the shortcomings of the Bill

 In its present shape, the Electoral Reform Bill looks dead in the water. Unless Government moves away from its disconcerting stubbornness and unwitting intransigence. Let us hope that reason and common sense will prevail and that it will reconsider its position and become open to sensible proposals. While there has been many proposals, three sets have retained the attention of policy makers. These are:

 i) The current proposals of government as contained in the Bill ;

 ii) The compromise reached by the Labour Party (LP) and the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) in 2014 ; 

iii) The recommendations of the independent Sachs Commission of 2002.

Specific proposals to improve the Bill

 We could borrow optimally from them to confect a reasonable compromise that could be accepted by most political parties. First, the Bill does not address the major objective for reforming our voting system. It will simply not narrow the massive disparity that exists between votes polled and seats obtained, especially in elections such as those of 1982, 1991, 1995, 2000 and 2005. 

The 12 PR seats are far too low and its method of allocation perverted as it gives more seats to the party that has already won a disproportionate share of FPTP seats. The distribution of the 6 to 10 additional seats is flawed as it restores the huge mathematical difference in seats from the FPTP outcome. 

A reasonable compromise would be to fold the two sets of seats into 20 PR seats (the 12 PR seats plus 8 seats which is the average between the 6 and 10 additional seats). This would give a Parliament of 63 FPTP seats and 20 PR seats. There would be no stand-alone additional seats; 

Second, the seats should be allocated by either a restricted Sachs Commission compensatory formula that would guarantee a working majority to the FPTP winner even in closely contested elections such as in 1983 and 1987 (a majority of around 10 seats) or by an ‘every vote counts’ mode that delivers a similar result. A parallel mode will widen the seat disparity between the winner and the second party, thus defeating the very aim of reform. That is why it has been comprehensively rejected by ALL electoral experts; 

Third, the appointment of 6 Members of Parliament (MP) by political leaders AFTER the elections is a travesty of democracy. That provision should be scrapped. There is no robust democracy where one individual arbitrarily appoints other persons as MP after polling. This corrosive and prone to corruption practice existed during the colonial days when the Governor chose some MP on a ‘look at’ basis. It was rightly abolished in 1967. Other countries use best practices to achieve the goal of diversity rather than this caricature of democracy. We should follow suit. See recommendations later. 

Fourth, the proposal of at least one third of women candidates overall is certainly better than the current awful situation of very low female political participation. But it is unfair as it could shortchange our women who deserve better as they represent 50.6% of the population and have more electors than men. They may be fielded in unwinnable constituencies so that one third of candidacies does not deliver one third of elected representatives. The simple and fairest solution is the one recommended by Sachs, with at least one female candidate per constituency, similar to what exists for municipal elections. 

Fifth, we should provide for a similar clause to have at least one third of Ministers who are women. As it exists in Canada and France (50%), Spain (65%) and even Nicaragua (53%), Rwanda (47%), South Africa (42%) and Albania (40%). Simply because we are in 2018 and we need a Parliament and a Cabinet that look more like the country it serves. 

This is a fundamental right and not a privilege. The country is ridiculously depriving itself of talents, skills and competence as women bring to the table a set of values, experience, expertise, drive, sense and sensibility that can be pivotal to the political debate and vital in shaping better policies. The exclusion of women is thus a loss for society as a whole.

 Sixth, the anti-defection provision is not ethical as it will encourage floor crossing for personal gains. This will continue to undermine the already low esteem that many have of politicians. We should send a very clear signal against floor crossing. PR Members of Parliament and additional MP should unconditionally forfeit their seats in case of defection. On balance, I also believe the same principle should apply for FPTP Members of Parliament, so as to restore trust and confidence in politics. We could, as a compromise, prevent such defecting FPTP MP from becoming Ministers or PPS unless they resign and are re-elected. 

Seventh, it is arguable whether we should use one set of votes (the three constituency votes) or two sets of votes (a second one for PR seats) in the mixed FPTP/PR system. One set would give an edge to stability, with more seats to large parties while two sets would favour small ones. Evidence across the world shows that it is less difficult for small parties to cross the 10% threshold with two sets of votes than with the amalgamation of the constituency votes.

 (Part 2 to follow)