| | Le grand gâteau | | | | Modifier la taille du texte: | A | | | A | | |
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| | Par:- Ariane CAVALOT-DE L’ESTRAC
On 22/09/2009 |
C’est un cadeau du ciel, en ces temps incertains. Quand les rentrées d’argent provenant des exportations se tarissent, quand le tourisme confirme sa vulnérabilité, oui, le volumineux flux de yuan est une grâce. La Chine installe ses entreprises, créant mille occasions d’affaires ; elle vient offrir des infrastructures dans un quartier mal loti, lui promettant du développement ; elle amène des milliers d’experts qui initieront une main-d’oeuvre au chômage à un savoir-faire nouveau ; elle apporte des techniques d’exploitation de nos ressources marines. Mais pourquoi alors cette suspicion autour de la zone de coopération Jin Fei ?
Il y a une part de psychologique dans ce malaise. Il naît peut-être de la disproportion entre la démesure du « don » et l’humilité du donneur. Ce financement à une échelle jamais vue sur notre terre est fait avec des airs de désintéressement déconcertants. La discrétion de la part de la Chine ferait presque conclure à quelque chose de sinueux, de louche. Mais ce n’est pas le cas.
C’est « la manière chinoise » de faire qui donne cette impression, l’Européen voire l’Indien étant plus exubérant.
Qu’est-ce alors ?
Ces questionnements porteraient peut être sur la motivation réelle de la Chine.
On connaît les raisons de sa présence en Afrique : sa croissance démesurée l’oblige à diversifier ses fournisseurs en hydrocarbures. Mais Maurice ? Quand l’Angola lui vend du pétrole, la Zambie le cuivre et Bamako du coton, qu’avons nous de si précieux qui explique cette grande générosité ? La « stabilité », disent les autorités. Difficile à avaler.
L’instabilité politique des pays africains n’a pas freiné l’intérêt de la Chine pour eux. Elle est d’ailleurs, politiquement, assez proche de leur vision selon laquelle la démocratie n’est pas un pré-requis au développement économique.
Les autres motifs évoqués ne sont pas plus convaincants : la constante non reconnaissance de Taiwan par Maurice ? Notre influence régionale ?
Notre… poisson, ressource moyennement précieuse ? La « persévérance » personnelle de Ramgoolam ? La possibilité d’immigration vers les pays africains, présentée comme une solution chinoise pour faire baisser la pression démographique, la surchauffe économique et la pollution ? Peut-être l’intérêt pour Maurice vient-elle de la conjugaison de ces facteurs.
Mais il y a encore ces échos qui viennent d’Afrique, qui contribuent au sentiment que JinFei n’est pas le paradis qu’on prétend. Dans plusieurs pays, la Chine a eu la même approche désintéressée et généreuse. Puis, les conflits ont émergé. En Zambie, qui lui a fait la fête quand, en 1998, elle sauvait de la fermeture une mine de cuivre, la tension dure depuis dix ans : mauvaises conditions de travail, faible rémunération.
Ailleurs, on l’a vu s’allier à des pays africains contestés pour leur absence de gouvernance. L’Afrique du Sud a, elle, dû refuser l’entrée au Dalai Lama.
Ailleurs, des appels d’offres ont été favorables aux « contracteurs » chinois. Quel type de dettes auront-nous face à la Chine demain ? Ce projet sera-t-il aussi « intégré » à nos réalités qu’on le dit.
C’est en somme le non-dit sur les conditions de cette coopération qui nourrit ce scepticisme. Les autorités avaient évoqué dans le passé les trente conditions imposées par la Chine, mais après les négociations, on ne sait pas ce qu’il en est aujourd’hui. L’absence de précisions incite à penser que ces conditions ne sont pas favorables à Maurice. Il n’en est sans doute rien, le cadre mis en place pour l’investissement étranger étant solide. Nous ne pouvons cependant pas ignorer le fait que beaucoup de pays africains se rendent compte aujourd’hui qu’ils n’ont pas été assez prudents.
Communiquer évitera les déceptions.
Le gouvernement devrait prendre le temps de rassurer la population. Il insiste sur l’effort qu’il a fallu fournir pour « intégrer » davantage le projet à la réalité mauricienne. Mais il ne nous dit pas les résultats de cet effort.
La population a besoin de savoir que nos dirigeants ont été suffisamment proactifs dans les négociations, qu’ils ont posé les barrières susceptibles de protéger nos intérêts, qu’ils n’ont pas agi pressés par l’échéance électorale. Nous voulons croire que l’intérêt du pays a primé, que l’envergure du projet n’a pas tourné la tête à nos dirigeants.
Nous ne savons pas par exemple s’il existe des conditions pour protéger l’industriel local. Ce nouvel horizon commercial pour les entreprises chinoises pourrait fermer celui de nos entrepreneurs. Les produits fabriqués à Riche-Terre, qui jouissent de facilités de l’Etat chinois et de main-d’oeuvre bon marché, seront compétitifs sur le marché mauricien et régional.
Nous ne savons pas dans quelle mesure les Mauriciens trouveront du travail grâce à JinFei, de quel type de travail il s’agira. Nous ne savons pas si les autorités le savent. Nous ne savons pas dans quelle mesure l’implication des constructeurs a été négociée pour cette nouvelle cité. Si les Chinois ont leur hôpital, ont leur école, ont leurs boutiques, se mêleront-ils à la population pour nourrir les petites affaires qui pourraient émerger autour de la zone ?
Ces incertitudes ne sauraient remettre en question l’intérêt majeur de ce projet. S’il a valu au gouvernement certaines concessions, ce serait mal venu de le critiquer. Il fallait ce projet.
La montée de la Chine est l’événement économique de notre temps. Passer à côté d’une telle proposition aurait été impensable. Si on a du mal à voir quelle part nous aurons concrètement dans les bénéfices de ce projet, on sait au moins que le gâteau est plus grand.
Bien plus grand.
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| Eric | | | Le premier ministre devrait penser a Diego Garcia et au proverbe anglais "he can't eat his cake and have it" | | | Baltazar | | | Ce grand gâteau chinois sera lourd à digérer pour les Mauriciens et ensuite beaucoup de mal au ventre. | | | Triptophan | | | In a truly progressive society who one does business with should be a moral issue. But this is not for us . We have lived in a society whose hall mark is summed up by the famous saying of Geatan Duval : " Largent pena lodeur" ( money does not smell). What democracy r u all talking about? | | | Ni How | | | Avec le rejet de Francafrique, les peuples semblent bien accueullir Chinafrique meme si elle achete aussi bien les dirigeants elle au moins ne souffre d'aucun proselytisme ou ethnocentrisme. | | | jj | | | Lire http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/world/africa/22namibia.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1&th&emc=th | | | MoralScientist | | | L'auteur ecrit "L’Afrique du Sud a, elle, dû refuser l’entrée au Dalai Lama.". Je peux affirmer que ce ne serait pas une mauvaise chose si Maurice, pour sa part, etait contrainte a declarer 'persona non grata' tout militant outrancier a la cause zioniste, en particulier tout un chacun, chanteur ou pas, qui cautionnerait les menaces constants d'Israel a attaquer militairement les centres Iraniens de recherches nucleaires.
| | | Mefiant | | | Prends l'exemple seki per arriver dan tibet, la chine in envahie sa pays la et per colonise li, pou faire li vine ene tipti la chine. Majoriter chinois, zot gouvernement ki dire zot ki bisin penser. ki l'interet la chine ena dan moris? ban o pouvoir conner zotte. population ki pancor comprends. pose zot la kestion ki la chine per vine fer dan moris? | | | FROM CHRONICLER | | | From: Chronicler
China: Partner in Africa?
JINFEI ECONOMIC ZONE- le non-dit sur les conditions de cette coopération qui nourrit ce scepticisme. Communiquer évitera les déceptions. Mauritius JinFei Economic Trade and Cooperation Zone. China in recent years has built up strong diplomatic and trade relations in Africa. In the near future China will have to develop some very useful models that can benefit Africa. The only contention is that this has not happened yet. For now, China's challenges have more to teach Africa than its successes. China, always more skilled than the West in soliciting goodwill, goes the extra mile to make its presence desirable. The conventional wisdom is that China presents Africa with major threats and opportunities, and that there is growing tension between the United States and China over the latter’s evolving African interests. On paper, at least, the nascent interest of China in Africa looks to the latter’s advantage. Beijing has an African trade target of $100 billion by 2010. Africa is a new continental market for lesser-priced Chinese exports, while it is a major source of raw materials, especially oil.
China has rapidly become the most assertive investor nation in Africa. More than 800 Chinese state-owned enterprises are today active on the continent, while Angola has now become China’s largest supplier of oil. Chinese firms have already invested more than $6 billion in Africa in 900 projects - notably in the oil sector. This, however, still represents only 3% of Chinese overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, illustrating the potential for future growth. The November 2006 Africa summit in Beijing was the largest diplomatic gathering ever in China. China has diplomatic relations with 48 of Africa’s 53 states - Gambia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Swaziland and Sao Tome apart.
At the Beijing summit, the hosts pledged to double African aid and to offer $5 billion in loans and credits by 2009, while it has granted government scholarships to almost 20,000 people from 50 African countries and sent some 16,000 medical professionals to 47 African countries. Strategic competition or co-operation? There is less clarity, however, on whether there is conflict between African interests on the one hand, and those of China and United States on the other. African countries face a conundrum with regard to China’s changing relationship with the continent. African domestic industries, in textiles and other areas, risk being swamped by cheaper Chinese products. Such concerns are raised by the investment trends of China - as well as the United States - in Africa, which have tended to be in the oil sector. This type of investment traditionally has not benefited African citizens for a range of reasons, including the nature of governance in those countries and macro-economic effects such as the overvaluation of currencies. Oil booms have generally enriched African elites and not their populations. These concerns relate to Africa’s emergence as a commodity superpower in a commodity super-cycle. The United States imports two-thirds of its oil needs, 15% of which comes from Africa. This figure could increase to 25% by 2015 (BBC). Africa produced 6.8 million barrels of oil per day in 1979. In 2005, this increased to over 9.8 million bpd. The second-largest global energy importer behind the US, China imported over six million bpd (International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2005). This figure is expected to double in the next 15 years. With only half of its energy needs now supplied by domestic sources, China is aggressively pursuing fresh oil interests in Africa, notably in the Sudan, which comprises one-tenth of all Chinese oil imports. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the largest investor in the Sudan. The benefit Africa generates from such investment depends more on what they themselves do than what China and the United States can do for Africa. Good governance is a prerequisite for the higher-order investments in Africa that its citizens consider essential, such as beneficiation of natural resources (that is, the treatment of raw material such as iron ore to improve its properties especially, eg in preparation for smelting). It is of course crucial that Chinese and US economic activities not implicitly or unconsciously undermine good governance. One of the best guarantees that a venture will promote African interests is the length of its engagement: a company that builds factories and mine shafts has a greater stake in stability and responsible government than does the short-term speculator. In addition, low human capacity, poor infrastructure and Africa’s small market size - Africa has an economy the same size as the state of Ohio - reduces its attractiveness for foreign investors. More importantly, however, such investors will follow the lead of their local African counterparts. The fact that Africans themselves are seen to be significant divestors in their own countries - around 40% of African capital has fled the continent - gives foreign investors scant confidence and comfort. Contrary to the general assertion that there is a contradiction between China’s Africa activities and improved standards of African governance and democracy, good governance is also in China’s best interest as it is the easiest means to ensure that investor interests can be safeguarded - a realization that Western countries had long since arrived at in Africa. Democracies have consistently performed better economically than autocracies - - hence their promotion would be in the investor’s enlightened self-interest. Moreover, support for autocratic governments by external powers is likely to pit them against African citizens who have consistently fought for such rights. Given the combination of high domestic investment (45%) and savings (50%) rates, China is likely to be able to sustain its current high growth phase and appetite for raw materials for the next two decades. This highlights the need for an Africa-China-US "win-win-win" strategy. A win-win-win strategy? China’s rise poses a tremendous challenge for African development. Given China’s industrial pre-eminence, African development is unlikely to come from high-volume manufacturing. Asian countries will probably dominate industries such as cheap clothing or footwear for a generation or more, thereby inhibiting most African countries from climbing the traditional first step of the industrialisation ladder. A combination of natural resource exploitation, agricultural self-sufficiency and high-value agro-exports, and the expansion of their unique range of service industries including tourism, would seem to be the most likely and rewarding growth path for many African states. This makes it imperative that more value from commodity investments in Africa stays on the continent. Three issues stand out whereby China, Africa and the United States could together promote Africa’s development. First is the need to raise the levels of transparency and corporate governance in Africa. Here African governments need to improve their legal and regulatory environments. US and Chinese firms - and governments - have a role to play in ensuring that the terms and conditions of deals are transparent so as to minimize opportunities for corruption, patronage and rent-seeking. There is a need to develop and transparently apply continent-wide principles of corporate good behaviour. Second, both Chinese and US aid money should be strategically targeted at projects that will stimulate growth by reducing the costs of doing business. In many countries, this will mean infrastructure investments in electricity, broadband Internet, roads and ports. It may also mean funding for legal and administrative reform or the hiring of foreign expertise including commercial judges. Third, while they should ensure the conditions for business are increasingly easy and competitive through better policy and fewer bureaucratic encumbrances, African governments should seek to make technology transfer and value addition a condition in their contract and concession negotiations with foreign firms. This will help to ensure that more value stays in Africa, creating employment and delivering development. Though China is not a colonialist, it is a successful capitalist in Africa. The path it has taken on that continent is consistent with the logic of market capitalism - liberal trade based on fair contracts. With its increasing investments in Africa, there is the possibility that Chinese business people will push African national industries aside and bankrupt national economic systems; meanwhile, more and more companies from China enter Africa, but they simply focus on profits regardless of their harmful influences on African societies, such as environmental pollution, excessive development, and exploitation of local labour. Although capitalism implies exploitation to many, China's capitalists have to limit their exploitation within the framework of WTO and abide by local laws. If Chinese business people are intent on destroying local national economic systems (for example, the local textile industry), African governments have the power to stop them, because all these states are sovereign. It can be seen that China is not now and will not likely become a colonizing power. China can demonstrate that by strictly keeping the promise written into the Beijing Declaration of 2006, which declares that Sino-African relations are based on political equality and economic cooperation, it will restrain itself from any harmful societal and political influences while engaging Africa, the last virgin land of capitalism. One balancing act must intervene though- Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa is countering the liberalising influences of Africa’s tra¬ditional European and American partners. It is in the U.S. national interest to address these develop¬ments in Africa by deftly encouraging democratic processes, economic freedom, and respect for human rights across the African continent.
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