| | A moins d’un miracle… | | | | Modifier la taille du texte: | A | | | A | | |
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| | Par:- Stéphane Saminaden
On 22/07/2009 |
L’assemblée générale des actionnaires d’«Air Mauritius» est prévue pour ce mercredi 22 juillet. Au vu de l’ambiance «spéciale» qui a régné lors des éditions précédentes, on n’aimerait pas être à la place des membres du conseil et de son nouveau président, Kamal Taposeea, qui devrait, en principe, être élu aujourd’hui.
Avec Rs 4 milliards de pertes pour l’exercice se terminant à mars 2009 – le coût du transfert de Christiano Ronaldo de «Manchester United» au Real – on peut comprendre que les actionnaires d’«Air Mauritius» soient particulièrement remontés. On le serait à moins.
Beaucoup a été dit déjà sur la gestion ou, plutôt, la mauvaise gestion de la compagnie nationale d’aviation. Toute proportion gardée, «Air Mauritius» souffre exactement du même problème que la
Corporation nationale de transport (CNT) : l’ingérence politique.
A la CNT, on a demandé à un consultant de faire un état des lieux de la situation. A «Air Mauritius» aussi il y a eu la même démarche avec le rapport McKinsey. A la MBC, il y a eu le rapport de l’audit. Tous arrivent à la même conclusion : l’ingérence politique amène à un sureffectif et à l’incompétence.
Que va-t-on faire pour régler ce problème qui ne date pas d’hier ni du gouvernement du jour ? Que va-t on faire de ce problème qui ne surprend personne tant il est de notoriété publique ?
Sans remettre en cause les mérites personnels des nouveaux nominés au conseil d’«Air Mauritius», la tâche la plus ardue ne sera pas de redresser financièrement la compagnie ; la fin de la crise l’année prochaine couplée à la fin du contrat de «hedging» qui court jusqu’à août 2010 devrait soulager le Paille en-Queue. La tâche la plus rude qui attend le nouveau président et son «board» sera d’apporter un changement de culture, non seulement, au sein de l’entreprise, mais aussi à l’Hôtel du gouvernement, qui tend à considérer le MEDCOR comme une annexe pour caser les petits copains et les colleurs d’affiche. Ce sera le véritable défi. Et comme personne ne croit aux miracles… | |
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| Le sheriff | | | I am sure many of you still remember that article " Auberge Espagnol". Air Mauritius is also carnet la boutik Tayak....scandal partout cote.
Air Mauritius et le Parti Travailliste meme zafaire = culture corruption. A dumnping ground for PT political agents or coller d'affices comme le dit si bien Jimmy. Mauriciens bizin Kondan zot magouilles. | | | jimmy | | | l egalite des chances a Air mauritius cest d etre des colleurs d affiche et petits copains | | | BARNET | | | From BARNET
The wrath of the disaffected investor.
L’assemblée générale des actionnaires d’«Air Mauritius»
An annual general meeting or extra ordinary general meeting where in the board of directors, auditors etc are appointed, accounts and reports on the performance are announced are known as share holders meeting. This is the only occasion a share holder can interact and influence the management of a corporation. The tall list of mismanagement acts at Air Mauritius has caused shareholders activism to move to a higher threshold. The citizens and shareholders have every good reason to question the management and board members, for the funds involved come from their contributions. Why is it that inside those luxury board rooms the interest of those that make so direct forms of investment ever get the wrong side of the stick. The endless talk and explanatory communiqués do not compensate the disillusioned stakeholders. Too often the remarks that business matters are lumped, and blanket approval are bestowed at Board and Management meetings as to get things done right away , such platitudes hurt and the message must reach those highly paid officials that hit and miss policies must never be part of the agenda for it adversely impact on the whole organisation. From the 1976 movie "Network," many investors are screaming, "We’re mad as hell and we’re not going to take it anymore!" They’ve lost a bundle of the retirement money they were soon supposed to be spending; both through the death of countless dot-coms and through the ensuing bear market stoked by the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Enron scandal hit with accusations of accounting improprieties and of top executives getting rich, while some employees suffered devastating financial losses. Lots of investors simply no longer trust the capital markets. Many factors have contributed to what experts see as a decline in the efficiency of the capital markets. And that, inevitably, leads to a weakened economy. In this volatile environment, corporate governance, basically how well management is tending to the business, and its impact on stock price performance has become more important than ever. Shareholders acting to monitor or even improve company performance in one form or another may prove an important factor in the effectiveness of that corporate governance. Angry individual investors have begun wielding their influence to, for one, find ways to hold managements more accountable for their actions, there are economic advisers — fundamentally concerned with the ongoing efficiency of capital markets — who regularly explore these types of corporate governance issues, including the impact institutional investors, as external monitors, have on underperforming firms. Daniel Rodriguez and Andrew Ward, professors of organization and management at Emory University’s Goizueta Business School, are two such individuals. In their paper "Shareholder activism and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms under conditions of poor corporate performance," they try to prove the potency of a particular form of shareholder activism — shareholder investor groups — in maintaining strong corporate performance and as a complement to existing means of governance. These groups are likely have more influence than the most large, well-known institutional investors. Large institutional investors like or Pension Fund have been known to monitor corporate governance at firms and try to encourage firms to adopt better governance mechanisms. This includes more incentive alignment for executives, more independent boards, separation of the chairmanship and CEO responsibilities, independence for the compensation committee on the board and better disclosure on the part of the companies. However in many cases these larger institutional investors are out to get their own gain, and may not scrutinize firms as closely as they should. A lot of the institutional investors are running away from these companies. They’re not so vested in their own companies, with generally less than 1% share. Large Funds Institutions were heavily involved in Enron. So how effective is this external monitoring mechanism? Enron is only one example of a bunch of companies with poor oversight. Council of Institutional Investors (CII) operates in the US. CII was formed in 1985 to "provide a unified voice for institutional shareholders," and it looked at corporate governance issues. In 1991, the group began to publish its Focus List of companies in hopes of sparking the companies to make a change. The concept of governance bundles, a combination of governance mechanisms, such as incentive alignment and board structure, that contributes to a company’s overall health. Companies have different optimal governance bundles. Can we add a third element to this governance bundle, external monitoring from groups likes CII? And can something like CII be introduced in Mauritius? Such an external monitoring proves to be valuable when it comes to corporate governance. In the analysis of CII’s impact on underperforming firms and how that impact sparks changes in internal corporate control mechanisms, there were drawn four key conclusions:<>; Shareholder activism can serve as a complementary governance mechanism, but only for those firms that exhibit some shareholder orientation (determined by the ability of the board to monitor management on behalf of shareholders, and the alignment of managerial incentives to correspond with shareholder interests);
• Institutional investors, although very supportive of shareholder activism, understand that [activism] does not result in improved governance bundles and firm performance for many companies whose governance bundles have fallen below a required minimum;
• The general investment community recognizes the potential complementarity between shareholder activism and governance bundles for reforming prior poor firm performance, and;
• Firms that exhibit sufficient internal monitoring mechanisms (at least a minimum governance bundle) prior to targeting by the shareholder activism, are likely to reform their governance bundle with both increased incentive alignment, without reducing monitoring, suggesting a complementary relationship between incentive alignment and monitoring as governance mechanisms in these firms.
Shareholder activism and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms under conditions of poor corporate performance" opens the door to future research on how shareholder activism may trigger subsequent improvements in the governance bundles of firms. The implications are that there should be more organizations like CII or there needs to be more suits brought against boards. Boards of directors need to be held more accountable. One either has to pump up the internal monitoring or support greater external monitoring. Mayday for Shareholders- Like many one is concerned with the way things are going in the country. The question is: Who in our circles will be listening?
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